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THE NEW FEUDAL SYSTEM*
A generation ago, in the reign of the historical legal science
of the last century, an address before a bar association was likely
to strike a note of praise. The path of the law was a progress
from status to contract; the development of the law was a
progressive unfolding of the idea of freedom. The footsteps of
the common law were planted in this path of progress. American
law had begun with the idea of freedom full blown. The legal
institutions and legal doctrines of nineteenth-century America,
the American developments and adaptations of the common law
of England, were held up to our admiration as the last stage for
the time being in this progress away from the status, the last
step for the time being in this unfolding of the idea of freedom.
With the advent of the present century the era of progressivism gave to speakers before bar associations a new note. For
a season an address was expected to be an attack upon something
or an argument for some new solving measure of change. In
the last decade the fashion for such discourses has changed
again. To day one is not unlikely to be expected to sound a high
and solemn note of warning.
I must disclaim any of these roles, and particularly the last.
I am not here to praise anything, to attack anything, nor to warn
against anything. The motive behind what I am to say to you is
s-imply one of curiosity. Obviously things are happening in the
economic and social order, and these happenings are reflecting
in the legal order. Behind these happenings is some sort of
change which may conceivably be far reaching. What it is to
be I make no pretense of knowing. But philosophers may rush
in where lawyers fear to tread. I do not fear the change, whatever it is to be. Yet I should like to make some guess at its
course. I should like to guess at it, not in order to devise futile
*Address delivered to the Kentucky State Bar Association, 1930.
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expedients for delaying it or warding it off, not in order to deplore it, but merely as part of a taking stock of an important
element in our legal materials. One whose interest lies in the
science of law may well seek to discover the reason for the failure of that element to achieve the purposes of the law under the
conditions of today. He may well seek to lay hold of some decisive feature in those conditions around which to begin to draw
another and more effective picture of an ideal social order. He
may well seek a beginning for constructing ideals of the legal
order more consonant with the society in which they are to
obtain.
We shall achieve nothing by an obstinate rear-guard action
against the adapting of legal institutions and legal doctrines to
the society they govern. In the end they will conform to the
needs of the economic and social order, not the economic or
social order to their logical or dogmatic demands. Yet all experience calls upon us to be very sure of ourselves when we have
to do with things so far reaching in their social and economic
consequences as the received ideals of the legal order. Speculation on such a subject should be cautious, but may not be avoided
if law is to be kept in touch with life.
In the classical law books of the eighteenth century and first
part of the nineteenth century, there used to be long, philosophical discussions of the ideal basis of every department of the law,
and often of each institution and doctrine and precept. The
coming of historical jurisprudence early in the nineteenth century made a change inevitable, and it came in the reign of
analytical jurisprudence which was dominant in English-speaking lands in the second half of that century. It became the accepted teaching that law was no more than an aggregate of laws.
All ideal element was rejected. Such is still, very likely, the
accepted view in the English-speaking world. But jurists have
been giving it over in the rest of the world and there are signs
of defection in this country, if not yet in England. Everywhere
the conviction is growing that our classical jurists were not
wholly wrong; that to understand law, to administer justice according to law, and to make law, we must admit some element
beyond and behind the mass of authoritative legal precepts and
the received technique of developing and applying them.
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No doubt the eighteenth-century writers were mistaken in
putting the ideal element of a body of law on a separate and
higher footing. They did not put it as one element along with
the mass of authoritative legal precepts and the received technique. They regarded it as the real law, of which precepts and
technique were but imperfect reflections. As natural law, it
was set off from positive law, which was but an aggregate of
rules, authoritatively prescribed by the sovereign or received
with his sanction, yet valid ultimately only because they reflected
the principles of the ideal system. For in the eighteenth century natural law came to be, as it were, codified. It was taken
to be a body of ideal precepts. Thus the real nature of the ideal
element in law was obscured. When we gave over the theory of a
distinct body of natural law, existing over and above the law of
the land, it was easy to believe that the positive law, which was
what remained, was but a body of precepts. The vice in the
eighteenth-century theory was in setting off that part of the
authoritative legal materials which were in the form of received
ideals from the received traditions of development and, application and the received or prescribed precepts, as something out-,
side of the positive law. It was no less a mistake to picture this
body of received ideals as a body of rules instead of as au
authoritative background for the making, interpreting, developing and applying of rules.
One element in the law, then, as I shall assume, is a body
of received ideals of the social order and so of the legal order;
a body of received ideals of what law is and what it is for, and
so of what legal precepts and legal principles ought to be and
how they ought to be applied in the light thereof. These received ideals are something more than subjective ideals of particular law makers or particular judges or particular writers.
Undoubtedly the received ideals, which are part of the law, are
affected by the personal ideals of strong law makers, strong
judges, masterful jurists. So it is with received doctrines which
are none the less part of the law of the land. To be part of the
law, ideals must have been received by the courts and the lawyers as such, exactly as in the case of received doctrines, received conceptions, received technique.
These received ideals are the background of all judicial
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action, whether in finding law, in interpreting it, or in applying
it. They give content and form to legal precepts and dictate
their application. This is the element we have in mind when we
speak of law as universal and rooted in the eternal verities. It
is this element which the pholosophical jurist has in mind when
he tells us that law cannot be made, it can only be found. With
his eye on this element only, he thinks of legislation and adjudication not as creative but as mere formulating processes. As he
sees it, the reality of law is in this ideal element. Legislator and
judge do no more than give definite formulation to details drawn
from this ideal picture of the whole. We may admit that this
view of the philosophical jurist is overdrawn and yet insist on
the paramount importance of the ideal element in determining
the actual course of justice. In law, as in everything else, by
and large men do what they seek to do, what they believe they
are doing. If they seek to do justice, if they believe they are
doing justice, and they have in their minds a received and definite picture of what constitutes justice, of what they are seeking
to do and why, the details of what they do are certain to be
shaped by that picture. Indeed the controlling part which received ideals play in judicial decision is shown whenever these
ideals are changing and the line between them and the personal
ideals of judges is obscured.
This has been manifest recently where courts have been
called upon to apply to social legislation the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. There are no texts defining
what is reasonable and what arbitrary and unreasonable. There
are no fixed starting points in established legal principles from
which to deduce mechanically and infallibly that this is reasonable and that is not. The question must be projected on a background of received ideals, received pictures of American society.
In effect it is projected upon a background of the common law
ideal as adapted to the new world in our formative era. What
fits into, what accords with that picture is held reasonable. W¥hat
does not is held arbitrary and unreasonable. In a time of transition, the details of such pictures are not always clear. It is
significant that dissents and five-to-four decisions are rare in
cases involving the law of property or the law of commercial
transactions, but are not uncommon where conduct is involved
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or where the question is one of reasonableness. In the latter
cases new situations, with respect to which the old pictures are
not clear, call for retouching or redrawing. The decisive ideal
element lacks definiteness and disagreement results.
It need not be said that these pictures of an ideal social order,
which come to enter into the law as part of the authoritative
materials of judicial decision are not photographs or even idealized photographs of the social order of the time and' place.
There are rather idealized pictures of the social order of the
past undergoing a gradual process of retouching with reference
to details of the social order of the present. Thus the received
ideals of American law, as they took shape in our classical era
in the first part of the nineteenth century, are much closer to the
dead and gone pioneer society of our past than to the typically
urban industrial society of twentieth-century America. In
general men have always sought to explain the institutions of the
present in terms of a picture of the social order of the past.
For example, Plato's Republic is a picture of an ideal Greek
city-state. Aristotle's Politics is a treatise on government in
terms of the Greek city as an independent economically and
politically self-sufficient unit. Each had Sparta in mind when
the Spartan type of state was passing forever from the stage.
Each had in mind the Greek city-state when the days of such
states were over. Again, the Medieval jurists had before their
minds the academic conception of "the empire "-the conception of an empire embracing all Christendom and continuous
with that of Augustus and Constantine and Justinian. This
idea of a universal empire with a universal law, gave rise to an
ideal which has been received in the law of half the modern
world and is still of cardinal significance in legal thinking everywhere. Yet it arose and was given shape and content at a time
when the Roman Empire, of which it was an idealization, was
utterly in the past; when the world was on the eve of the
nationalism which followed the Reformation.
Look at the picture behind our classical seventeenth-century
law books, the received ideals of the social and legal order as
they appear in Coke on Littleton and Coke's Second Institute.
In our formative period, these books were oracles in the new
world for our private law and public law respectively. Cer-
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tainly there was behind them no picture of Colonial. American
Society. Nor were they even written on a background of Elizabethan society. The system described in Littleton's Tenures was
moribund when the book was written. It is no more in the
spirit of the England of Shakespeare than the pedantic formal
logic of Coke on Littleton is anything but an anachronism in the
days of Bacon. Yet this spirit of medieval England, this idealized picture of relationally organized pre-Reformation England,
was an enduring element in the body of legal materials which
came to govern English speaking people everywhere.
It is not so easy to speak with assurance of the received
ideals of our twentieth-century law. Yet I venture to think that
while the psychologist of today feels about the fundamental conception of the classical economics-about the economic man following the path shown him by enlightened self-interest-as
Bacon did about the scholastic method and Aristotelian logic of
Coke on Littleton, yet that picture of the economic man is as
real and persistent part of our law as Coke's method and logic
were a real and persistent part of the law of Bacon's time. Even
more, our American politico-legal ideal of a pioneer, rural,
agricultural community cannot but irritate the social scientist
of the twentieth century. Yet it is in the background of everyday decision and is perhaps more decisive for the administration of justice here and now than in the heyday of the society it
pictures. Where, today, are the economically self-sufficient
households and neighborhoods, where is the economically selfsufficient, versatile, restless, self-reliant man, freely making a
place for himself by free self-assertion, which that ideal assumes
and portrays? Where, indeed, but in our legal thinking in
which it is so decisive an element?
Let us look back on the picture of the social order which
has been standard for jurists since the seventeenth century. It
is a picture of a world of free competition among individually
self-sufficing human economic units, with the fullest measure of
free, individual self-assertion put as the highest good. I suppose one runs some risk in querying whether this is at all a picture of the actual world in which we live. Controversies attaching to it when it did represent an actual world have come down
to us with it and make hard the path of the objective observer.
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But from the days of the Greek philosopher, professors have been
privileged to be heretics. I venture to suspect that our orthodox
jurist's picture of an ideal American social order is as out of line
with realities as was the picture of an idealized Greek city-state
on the threshold of the Hellenistic world, or of Christendom as a
universal Roman empire on the threshold of nationalism-while
the nations of modern Europe were growing strong and self conscious and independent. Indeed international law furnishes an
excellent, because non-controversial, example. Since the seventeenth century international law has had for its background a
picture of the political world as it was when Grotius wrote. The
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were an era of absolute
governments. Personal sovereigns, of the type of the king
under the ancient regime of France, ruled in the significant
countries of Western Europe. The problem of international law
was one of adjusting the relations and guiding the international
conduct of these personal sovereigns. They made war with
highly trained regular armies. They represented their several
countries so completely that for practical purposes international
relations could be treated as relations between sovereigns and
the rules of war as limitations on the belligerent conduct of
sovereigns. International law grew up to this picture and we
still speak and think to its outlines. Yet it long ago ceased to
portray reality. Such phenomena as the British empire, the
rise of democratic government, the conduct of war by peoples by
every agency they may command, rather than by personal rulers
through standing regular armies-these phenomena defy intelligent treatment on the lines of the classical picture.
Perhaps the most significant evidence of what has happened
to our orthodox individualism is furnished by a recent pronouncement of Henry Ford. I would not disparage his powers
of observation. When he said that'history was "bunk," he put
epigrammatically what the philosophers of history and historians
of history-writing are taking volumes to tell us. No doubt when
he reproached American farmers for not being individualists he
had his eye on a profound divergence between the farmer and
the rest of us. Certainly the farmer in his thought, his method,
his want of organization in an organized age, is much nearer to
the American of our formative era than those of us who are in
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step in the regimented life of today. Why then should the
farmers, the old guard of American individualism, struggling
valiantly for the old economic order in a new economic world, be
reproached for want of individualism? I suppose the chain of
reasoning goes like this: Individualism is good, so what is good
is individualism. Methods that can amass a billion dollars are
good, therefore they are individualist. The methods of the
American farmer, as applied in the world of today will never
amass any considerable sums of money. Hence they are bad.
Hence they are not individualist. Q. E. D. Could anything show
better how far we are forgetting what the individualism of the
last century really meant? Could anything show more clearly
that we are but throwing about a word that has become empty
in the economic life of our time?
Such twisting of the watchwords and solving phrases of the
past to meanings satisfying to the wants of today are among
the staple modes of growth in law. Behind them are changes in
the ideals of the social order responding slowly to changes in the
actual social order. Conflict of the received ideals with newer
ones, idealizing conditions which are coming to be and competition of the resulting pictures with those which idealize conditions as they are ceasing or have ceased to be, are fruitful causes
of uncertainty in law and in the application of law in any period
of growth.
At the time of colonization the English common law was
made up almost wholly of land law and procedure. Moreover
these two subjects were those chiefly called for in a pioneer
American community. Land titles were the most important
subject of litigation and for the rest it was enough to
provide for bringing controversies before the courts and disposing of them there. Land law, therefore, was long the dominant branch of the substantive law. The spirit of the land law
was largely the spirit of the common law. The leading analytical jurists were real-property lawyers. Thus the science of law,
for England and America, came to look at law from the standpoint of rules of property. Also our theory of application of
law was made for rules of property, so that when, in the present
century, we had to turn more and more to administration, for a
time it was far from easy to adjust our legal ideas to the de-
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mands of a new type of tribunal. In large part the received
ideals of our law come from the feudal land law which took form
in the liddle Ages. Partly they comae from the contests between
courts and Crown in seventeenth-century England. Partly, too,
they come from the conditions of pioneer communities in the
period after the Revolution. It is to the oldest of these elements
in our body of ideals that I would direct your attention.
Until the end of the last century, the details of what was at
least taken to be the feudal organization of society were part of
the education of every lawyer. Today the first-year law student
is impatient of even the minimum which he must acquire in
order to understand even the terminology of our law of real
property. But forty years ago, when I was a law student, we
still took the feudal element in our law seriously and the student
s t himself to learn these details patiently on the assurance of
his teachers that they were an indispensable preliminary to our
understanding of the Anglo American legal system. These details, as we learned them from Coke on Littleton and Blackstone's Commentaries, had for the most part been made obsolete
if not earlier, at least by the Statute of Charles II abolishing
tenures. Yet down to the present generation the lawyer was
expected to learn, as preliminary to the common-law estates and
the acquisition, creation and conveyance of them, the theory of
feudal organization, the old tenures, the incidents of tenure, the
effect of a conveyance before and after Q'ia Emptores, the subinfeudations, and much else that no amount of zeal on the part
of the teacher can make interesting to the student of today.
Nor was this without reason. The forms of conveyance then in
use retained the liabendunt et tenendum clause which Quia
Emptores had deprived of meaning in the thirteenth century,
and much which had lost meaning through the legislation of the
seventeenth century. At least this instruction in the legal
theory and legal structure of feudal society, this familiarity with
fines and reliefs and wardships and the like, taught us what was
vital and what empty verbiage in the old forms of conveyance
and so, perhaps, led us with assurance to the simpler forms of
today. When Coke dared to write of ownership in fee simple
and to think of the tenant in fee simple as the absolute owner of
the land in which he held an estate, the substance of tenure was
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gone, although whether tenure existed in one of our great states
could be the subject of acrimonious discussion in the second
decade of the present century and could be debated in the Association of American Law Schools in the third decade.
Certainly it has seemed that the feudal learning, which was
once so great a part of the educational equipment of the American lawyer, had ceased to have value. It seemed clearly time to
cast off what had become the merest historical rudiment. Indeed
an American law school has gone further recently and has announced that Coke and Blackstone are to be put on the shelf.
No doubt Coke on Littleton is meant, for Coke's Second Institute is still a useful introduction to our constitutional law. But
it is curious that we should be putting the authoritative repositaries of the feudal land law on the shelf just at the time when
the kind of relational society which they picture has revived;
Just at the time when the ideas of relation to property and relation of man to man which they set forth may once more be useful for legal thinking. For centuries we studied Coke on Littleton after its spirit and ideas had ceased to be active forces in the
law. Now we are to give up this oracle of our land law at the
very time when it may be useful to us.
What is our orthodox picture of the society which is ordered
by law, to which, therefore, the details of the administration of
justice are to conform? It is one which has governed from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, getting what is likely to
prove its final form in the latter. It is a picture in which relation is ignored and each man is made to stand out by himself
as an economically, politic(ally, morally and hence legally self
sufficient unit. He is to find his place by free competition. The
highest good is the maximum of free self assertion on the part of
these units. The significant feature of these units is their
natural rights, that is qualities by virtue of which they ought to
have certain things or be free to do certain things. The end of
law is to secure these natural rights, to give the fullest and
freest rein to the competitive acquisitory activities of these units,
to order the competition with a minimum of interference. Even
now one must outwardly do lip service to this picture on pain
of being branded a "socialist."
But both this orthodox individualism of the nineteenth century and the orthodox socialism
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which was its contemporary are dead as significant ways of
thinking.
Relativity has done a great service in setting us free from
the dilemma in which we had put ourselves quite unnecessarily
in the sociological and political and legal thinking of the past.
We had assumed that in every connection in which we were confronted by what seemed a choice, we must inevitably and inexorably choose one to the exclusion of the other. We could only
look at things from one standpoint. We could only and must
needs emphasize some one feature, which alone had real significance. At any point of divergence we must irrevocably follow
out one path to the logical bitter end. Hence as between the free
individual and an ordered society, as between a regime of full
and free competition and one of cooperation, as between natural
rights and the general security, there was of necessity one exclusive choice. We must range ourselves with the one series or with
the other. We must put the whole stress on the one or on the
other. We must let everything be fought out in an ordered
struggle or else commit everything to an oinicompetent state.
A superlative valuing of individual personality or a superlative
valuing of organized society were necessary and all excluding
alternatives.
This narrow mode of thought long stood in the way of an
effective pholosophy of law. Now that it is dissipated, now that
we know that the universe can be both finite and without bounds,
now that we realize that we are not held eternally to a rigid
choice of an absolute personalism or absolute transpersonalism,
it is possible to look on competition and cooperation as sides or
phases of something which transends both. We are not held to
stress individual free self-assertion at the expense of all other
aspects of human life. We are not bound to lay the whole stress
upon the unique side of the individual man at the expense of
control over internal nature which makes it possible for man
to inherit the earth and to maintain and increase that inheritance. In civilization, in the raising of human powers to their
highest possible unfolding, in the maximum of control over
nature, both external and internal for human purposes, we have
an idea which transcends b6th the individualism and the social-
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ism of the last century. As exaggerated versions of equally valid
sides of civilized life, there is both truth and untruth in each.
Let us, then, give over the conventional nineteenth century
labels and seek to look at the phenomena of the economic order
without reference to them.
We understand new things by comparing them with old
things with which we have become familiar. To the lawyer,
trained in the old books of our Anglo-American law, it would
not be hard to paint a picture of the economic order of the
present, as it is and as it is becoming, in terms of those classical
books.
Recall the broad lines of the social organization in which
our law had its rise. Society was organized about relations. It
rested on relations and duties, not on isolated individuals and
rights. Everyone, no matter how great or how small was in a
relation to some one else-a relation involving reciprocal duties
of service and of protection. The original fundamental idea was
cooperation in defense. The single individual had not proved
equal to defending himself. Hence he was not thought of as
self-sufficient. In the beginning he commended himself to some
lord, that is, he surrended his land to some lord who then owed
him protection and to whom he owed service. If a lord acquired
a new domain, he gave interests or estates in it to his retainers,
and was bound to protect them therein while they were bound
to do the services and perform the incidents attached to their
estates. In England, all land came to be held. On the Continent there was still land held in full ownership by owners of the
old type. But there also the general course came to be that one
held of some lord. The typical man did not compete. He had
his place in a cooperative organization. The several economic
activities, in such division of labor as obtained in a medieval
community, were conceived as services. Thus the services due
the lord from the holder of an estate might be services to the
feudal community in which he had his estate. He was held in
his place by duty of service instead of by pressure of competition. He found his individual greatness in the greatness of his
lord, not in competitive achievement. He did not own land. He
had an interest in it; he owned an estate in it. Hence whoever
owned anything for that very reason stood in a relation. Estate
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and relation, relation and reciprocal duties were inseparable.
When these estates were conveyed, an elaborate series of rights
and duties resulted. Before the statute of Quia Emptores there
might be a long chain of holdings, one of another, with services
due all along the line. Quia Em ptores simplified this. But it
remained that men owned not the land but an interest in it, that
the emphasis was on duties not on rights, that the duties of protection and of service were reciprocal, that the watchword was
cooperation, that the significant thing was relation, with duties
of doing the several things which the community required resting on those who had interests to which those duties were
attached. It was not what men undertook from self interest or
caprice. They were held to what their position in the relationally organized society made it their duty to do.
In time politically organized society had put down privata
war. The duty of protection owed by the lord ceased to be of
consequence. Defence was no longer a prime consideration.
Economic activity took the first place which had been held by
military activity.
When each household was economically independent, when
each neighborhood performed within itself the main functions
called for by such division of labor as a rural agricultural society
demanded, a relationally organized society was wholly out of
line with the economic order. But the days when the local miller
ground the flour for the local community from the grain grown
by the local farmer, and this flour was baked by the local baker
and the local housewives, are hardly even remembered in our
great urban communities and are passing in their last rural
strongholds. The days when the local butcher provided the
local meat from animals sold him by the local farmers, and the
hides were tanned by the local tanner and made into shoes for
his local customers by the local cobbler are utterly gone. Gone.
too, are the days when the local founder provided materials for
the local blacksmith and the local carriage maker made the local
vehicles. These days of local economic self sufficiency are wholly
in the past. Hence the individual can no longer do singlehanded the aggregate of things demanded by the minute division
of labor in a complex economic organization. The situation
created by the economic order is analogous to that presented by
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the social order when the individual landowner, unequal to protecting himself, entered into a relation of service and protection
with a lord. For the days when the individual business man
was self-sufficient are also in the past. More and more he has
proved insufficient for any but the smallest businesses. He has
had to commend himself by transferring his business to a corporation and taking shares in its stead.
In our economic order business and industry are the significant activities. They stand toward the social order of today
where land-holding stood toward the social order of the Middle
Ages. Every one in business, great or small, is in a shareholder
relation in which things are due him as shareholder, not because
of any special undertaking. He is not freely competing. The
great bulk of the urban community are upon salaries and owe
service to corporations which of late have sometimes shown consciousness of owing a reciprocal protection. The individual
'businesses are more and more giving up and going into corporate
form. The corporations are more and more merging. Chair
stores are bringing about a feudal organization of businesses
which hntil now had been able to exist on the older basis. If a
new domain of business or industry is opened, those who have
conquered it distribute stock as a great feudal lord distributed
estates. It is coming to be the general course that men do not
own businesses or enterprizes or industries. They hold shares
in them. Moreover, as one who held several tracts of land might
owe services to more than one lord, so one who holds investments
may be a shareholder, with the reciprocal duties that relation
implies, in more than one corporation.
Today the typical man (for the city dweller, not the farmer
is the type for this time) finds his greatness not in himself and
in what he does but in the corporation he serves. If he is great,
he is published to the world not as having done this or that, but
as director in this company and that. If he is small, yet he
shines in the reflected glory of the corporation from which he
draws a salary. Moreover the chain of subinfeudations, of subsidiary companies, and affiliated companies, and holding companies has come to be as intricate as that of mesne tenancies before
Quia Emptores. It may yet call for some analogous statute to
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put intelligible simplicity into the tenure by which our businesses and industries are held.
But the significant point is to contrast the feudal self-sufficient community with the individualist self-sufficient man, and
then contrast the latter, as he had a real existence in the pioneer,
rural, agricultural society of the past, with the employee, shareholder, investor of today, held at least in one and often in many
relations, with shares or interests rather than ownership in the
things which count; cooperating rather than competing; finding
his satisfactions in the achievements toward which he contributes rather than in what he achieves of himself.
As I have put these contrasts, they suggest something of a
return to ideas of the Middle Ages. But that is not what I have
in mind. History does not repeat itself in any such sense.
Things in time are unique. No one could pretend that we shall
ever return exactly to a feudal organization of society. Yet we
do seem to be developing a relationally organized society. Our
picture can no longer be one of free competitive activity of economically self-sufficing units. It must be redrawn as one of
adjusted relations of economically interdependent units. The
orthodox picture is too much out of line with the actual economic
and social situation to serve us longer. This does not mean that
we must give up everything which has been gained for spontaneous, free, individual initiative by the Reformation, the Puritan Revolution, the contests of courts with crown, and the democratic movement of the last century. But it does mean that the
orthodox picture includes far two little; that it excludes much
which we can not overlook. It has become a cause of uncertainty in law and in its administration. It has become a cause
of dissatisfaction on the part of the business world with a state
of things in which no one can speak with assurance as to what is
the law at a time when the law is actually or potentially regulating everything. In drawing a new picture, we need something to guide us to seizing the significant features. We may
yet have to apply Coke's admonition: "Observe, reader, your old
books."
ROSCOE PoUNu
Harvard Law School

